Existing studies assume that the impact of democracy on FDI is the same for resource exporting and non-resource exporting countries. This paper examines whether natural resources alter the relationship between FDI and democracy. We estimate a linear dynamic panel-data model using data from 112 developing countries over the period 1982-2007, and we …nd that there is some critical value of the share of minerals and oil in total exports below which democracy enhances FDI, and above which democracy reduces FDI. We identify 90 countries where an expansion of democracy may enhance FDI and 22 countries where an increase in democratization may reduce FDI. We are thankful to the editor Bruce Blonigen and three anonymous referees for detailed and valuable suggestions. We also thank Christobel Asiedu,
Introduction
In the past two decades, there has been a signi…cant shift in the attitude towards foreign direct investment (FDI) to developing countries. Speci…cally, the discussion among academics and policymakers has shifted from whether FDI should be encouraged to how developing countries can attract FDI. Indeed many international development agencies, such as the World Bank, consider FDI as one of the most e¤ective tools in the global …ght against poverty, and therefore actively encourage poor countries to pursue policies that will enhance FDI ‡ows. 1 However, many of the countries that want to attract FDI also have weak democracies or nondemocratic governments. It is therefore important to understand the e¤ect of democratization on FDI. For example, if democracy deters FDI, then countries face a trade o¤ -between increased democratization and attracting more FDI.
This paper answers three questions: (i) Does democracy facilitate FDI?; (ii) Do natural resources alter the relationship between FDI and democracy?; and (iii) Do foreign direct investors prefer less democracy when they operate in natural resource exporting countries?
Answers to these questions cannot be discerned from theory because the theoretical impact of democracy on FDI is unclear. 2 On the one hand, democratic institutions may have a positive e¤ect on FDI because democracy provides checks and balances on elected o¢ cials, and this in turn reduces arbitrary government intervention, lowers the risk of policy reversal and strengthens property right protection (North and Weingast, 1989; Li 2009). 3 On the other hand, multinational corporations (MNCs) may prefer to invest in autocratic countries.
One reason is that unlike a democracy, autocratic governments are not accountable to their electorates. As a consequence, autocratic governments may be in a better position to provide more generous incentive packages and also o¤er protection from labor unions (Li and Resnick, 2003) . In addition, it is easier for MNCs to exploit their oligopolistic or monopolistic positions when they operate in autocratic countries (Li and Resnick, 2003) . Thus, the overall e¤ect of democracy on FDI has to be determined empirically.
There is a vast empirical literature on the determinants of FDI, however, only a few of the studies include democracy as an explanatory variable. Our extensive literature review revealed that the empirical research on FDI and democracy is scant and also recent. We 1 For example, the key function of the World Bank's Multilateral Investment Guarantees Agency (MIGA) is to facilitate FDI to poor countries. Also, the United Nations millennium declaration stipulates that an increase in FDI to developing countries will result in a signi…cant reduction in global poverty rates. 2 See Li and Resnick (2003) and Jensen (2003) for a detailed discussion about the theoretical impact of democracy on FDI.
3 Due to the irreversible nature of FDI, the risk of policy reversal (e.g., changes in tax laws, royalty fees, etc) has a profound adverse impact on FDI. Li (2009) argues that democratic regimes are less likely to expropriate FDI than autocratic governments. He documents that between 1960 and 1990 there were 520 incidents of expropriation, and autocratic governments were responsible for about 423 of these incidents. found only twelve published articles which included democracy as a determinant of FDI, and only two of the papers were published before 2000. Eight of the studies found a positive and signi…cant relationship between democracy and FDI, three found no signi…cant e¤ect, and only one study found a negative e¤ect. 4 The existing studies have several limitations. First, there is the issue of reverse causality: the relationship between FDI and democracy may be bidirectional. 5 Second, the measure of democracy is likely to exhibit measurement errors.
Third, there is the problem of an omitted variable bias. For example, only four papers included natural resources as an explanatory variable in their regressions. 6 As we show in Section 5, natural resources has a causal e¤ect on FDI. These three potential problems suggest that endogeneity may be a concern. Yet, none of the existing studies address this potential endogeneity problem. Another limitation is that most of the papers do not take into account the persistent nature of FDI. Furthermore, eleven out of the twelve papers employed ordinary least squares (OLS) or …xed e¤ects (FE) estimations. One of the advantages of the FE estimator is that it mitigates some of the biases associated with OLS. However, the possible endogeneity of democracy, the short time periods of the panel data, and the persistent nature of FDI suggest that the FE estimator is likely to produce inconsistent and biased estimates. One more caveat of the existing literature is that all the studies assume that the e¤ect of democracy on FDI is the same for resource exporting and non-resource exporting countries. This assumption seems inconsistent with the data. 5 Li and Reuveny (2003) …nd that FDI has a positive e¤ect on democracy and Dutta and Roy (2009) …nd that FDI has a positive and signi…cant e¤ect on press freedom. 6 The discussion of natural resources in these papers was cursory. Speci…cally, Jakobsen and de Soysa (2006) and Jakobsen (2006) reported that the estimated coe¢ cient of the natural resource variable was not signi…cant, and therefore did not include the natural resource variable in the estimations reported in the paper. Busse (2004) included natural resources in only one regression. Harms and Ursprung (2002) de…ned natural resource availability as a dummy that takes on value one if a country is a net exporter of oil throughout the 1990s and zero otherwise. Since natural resource is de…ned as a dummy variable, the variable was excluded in the …xed e¤ects regressions. countries in Group 1, FDI seems to be positively associated with democracy for all the three measures of democracy (…gures 1a, 2a and 3a). This contrasts with the Group 2 countries, where democracy seems to be negatively correlated with FDI (…gure 3b) or uncorrelated with FDI (…gures 1b and 2b). Thus, the data suggest that foreign direct investors prefer democratic governments when they operate in non-resource exporting countries, but prefer less democratic or nondemocratic governments when they operate in resource exporting countries. The relevance of natural resources in determing the relationhsip between FDI and democracy is also consistent with the results of the 2007 global survey conducted by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), where 44% of …rms in extractive industries reported that democracy was important to their investment decisions, compared with 52% for all the …rms surveyed (EIU, 2008) . This paper reassesses the relationship between democracy and FDI. We estimate a dynamic panel data model where we interact the measure of democracy with the share of the sum of minerals and fuel in total merchandise exports, nat. Our analyses utilize a panel data of 112 developing countries over the period 1982-2007. We employ three measures of democracy from three di¤erent sources and we utilize two estimation techniques-the dynamic panel "Di¤erence" General Method of Moments (GMM) estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991), and the "System" GMM estimator proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998) . We …nd that there is some critical value of nat below which democracy enhances FDI, and above which democracy reduces FDI. We identify 90 countries where an expansion of democracy may enhance FDI, and 22 countries where an increase in democratization may reduce FDI. We disaggregate the measure of natural resources into its two components -fuel as a share of exports and minerals as a share of exports -and …nd that the relationship between FDI and democracy depends on the "size"and not the "type" of natural resources. Finally, we show that our results are robust: they hold for di¤erent estimation procedures, alternative measures of democracy, di¤erent sub-samples, di¤erent time periods, when we control for FDI risk, institutional quality, political risk, and when we take into account the endogeneity of natural resources and democracy. In all the regressions, we control for macroeconomic instability, market size, openness to trade and infrastructure development in host countries.
The paper contributes to the literature in two ways. First, to the best of our knowledge this is the …rst study to analyze the interaction e¤ect of natural resources and democracy on FDI. Second, the estimation techniques that we employ ameliorate some of the econometric problems that plague previous studies. Speci…cally, the estimators account for unobserved country-speci…c e¤ects, mitigate any potential endogeneity problems, permit the inclusion of lagged dependent variables as well as endogenous explanatory variables, and also accom-modate panel data with short time periods.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides plausible reasons why natural resources may alter the relationship between FDI and democracy. Section 3 describes the data and the variables, Section 4 discusses the estimation procedure, Sections 5 and 6 present the empirical results, and Section 7 concludes. Second, typically, regulations that cover FDI in extractive industries are fuzzy and the interpretation of the rules is at the discretion of top government o¢ cials. A good example is Botswana where taxation and government ownership share in diamond mining are subject to case-by-case negotiations, and the minister has power to remit or defer royalty on these investment. In such situations, a change in government e¤ectively implies a change in a country's investment framework, which in turn implies an unstable policy environment. A stable policy environment is particularly important to MNCs in extractive industries because the exploration and extraction of minerals involve an initial large-scale capital intensive investment (i.e., sunk cost), a high degree of uncertainty and long gestation periods. 8 Thus,
to the extent that longevity of government implies a more stable and predictable business environment, democratic regimes are less preferable because democracies are typically associated with a frequent change of government o¢ cials. The view that autocratic regimes 7 Consider an extreme case such as a dictatorship. Here, the MNC may need the approval of only one top government o¢ cial in order to authenticate the …rms'operations. Furthermore, if the MNC is successful in lobbying the o¢ cial, the …rms'e¤orts are almost guaranteed to produce results. In contrast, democratic institutions typically work on consensus, power is more di¤used and the legislature is controlled by multiple groups. As a consequence, more resources and time are spent on lobbying e¤orts. Moreover, the outcome of the lobbying e¤orts is less predictable. 8 The relative importance of a stable policy environment for MNCs in the primary sector is noted in the EIU (2008) survey. In the survey, MNCs in the primary sector indicated that "a stable and business-friendly environment" is the second (out of twelve) most important location criterion (the most important factor is access to natural resources). In contrast a stable policy environment ranked nine out of twelve for MNCs in manufacturing, and seven out of twelve for MNCs in the services sector. The two most important location factors for MNCs in services and manufacturing are the size of local markets and the growth of markets.
provide a more stable business environment is consistent with the EIU survey results where about 62% of the respondents agreed with the statement that authoritarian regimes provide a more stable and predictable business environment. The third plausible explanation is that in many resource exporting countries, MNCs in extractive industries are prohibited from forming wholly-owned subsidiaries, and are often required to share ownership with the government (Asiedu and Esfahani, 2001 ). Naturally, an MNC will prefer to have a stable joint venture partner, and this is less likely to occur under a regime where the government in power changes every few years, such as in a democracy. Finally, we note that FDI in extractive industries is mainly driven by access to natural resources in host countries. However, natural resources are considered to be of strategic, political and …nancial importance to host countries and are therefore tightly controlled by the government. Thus, having close ties with the government may imply gaining access to an invaluable production input. Clearly, such relationships are easier to foster under autocratic regimes.
The Data and the Variables
Our empirical analyses utilize panel data of 112 developing countries over the period 1982-2007 (see the appendix for the list of countries). As it is standard in the literature, our dependent variable is net F DI=GDP and we average the data over four years to smooth out cyclical ‡uctuations. The descriptive statistics of the variables is reported in Table1.
Democracy
There are many sources that provide ratings on the level of democratization in various countries. As expected, none of the measures of democracy is perfect. For example, Poe and Tate (1994) argue that the Freedom House data on civil and political liberties, which are one of the most utilized data in the profession, are biased in favor of Christian nations and Western democracies. Casper and Tu…s (2003) also caution that di¤erent measures of democracy, even when highly correlated, may not be interchangeable because they may produce di¤erent results. Therefore in order to increase the credibility of our results, we employ three di¤erent measures of democracy from three di¤erent sources for our benchmark regressions.
The …rst measure of democracy, f ree, is derived from the data on political rights published by Freedom House. The data ranges from one to seven. A rating of one implies "there are competitive parties or other political groupings, the opposition plays an important role and has actual power" and a rating of seven indicates that political rights are absent. The second measure, polity, is derived from the democracy index published in Polity IV, and it re ‡ects the openness and the competitiveness of the political process as well as the presence of institutions that allows political participation. The index ranges from zero to ten, where a higher rating implies higher levels of democracy. The third measure, icrg, is the measure of democracy published in the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). The data are published by Political Risk Services, and it re ‡ects the extent to which elections are free and fair, and the degree to which the government is accountable to its electorate. The data ranges from one to six, a higher score implies more democracy and accountability. To ease comparison between the di¤erent measures of democracy, we follow Acemoglu et al. (2008) and normalize f ree, polity and icrg to lie between zero and one, such that a higher number implies more democracy. The three measures of democracy vary in terms of coverage and availability. The regressions that employ f ree as a measure of democracy have up to 652 observations and covers 112 countries, polity has 614 observations and covers 102 countries, and icrg has 551 observations and it covers only 87 countries. The ICRG data are targeted toward foreign investors and as a consequence, the data are not available for many small or poor countries, or for countries that receive very little FDI. Furthermore, many of the countries in our sample for which the ICRG data is missing have high F DI=GDP relative to the mean. This clearly generates a potential sample selection problem.
Natural Resources
We employ three measures of natural resources to capture a country's natural resource export intensity: (i) The share of fuel in total merchandise exports, f e; (ii) The share of minerals in total merchandise exports, me; and (iii) The share of fuel and minerals in total merchandise exports, nat, where nat = me + f e. We use these measures for three reasons. First, they provide an indication of the type of FDI that goes to a country. For example, oil exporting countries are likely to have FDI concentrated in the oil sector. Second, the measures re ‡ect the importance of natural resources to the host country. Such information is important in explaining our main result, that foreign direct investors may prefer less democracy in natural resource exporting countries. Third, the measures have been employed in several studies and also the data are readily available. 9 We hypothesize a negative association between natural resources and FDI for the following three reasons. The …rst reason is based on the idea that resource booms lead to an appreciation of local currency. This makes the country's exports less competitive at world prices, and thereby crowds out investments in non-natural resource tradable sectors. If the crowding out is more than one-for-one, it may lead to an overall decline in FDI. The second reason is that natural resources, in particular oil, are characterized by booms and busts, leading to increased volatility in the exchange rate (Sachs and Warner, 1995). In addition, a higher share of fuel and minerals in total merchandise exports implies less trade diversi…-cation, which in turn makes a country more vulnerable to external shocks. All these factors generate macroeconomic instability and therefore reduce FDI. Finally, FDI in natural resource rich countries tend to be concentrated in the natural resource sector. While natural resource exploration requires a large initial capital outlay, the continuing operations demand a small cash ‡ow. Thus, after the initial phase, FDI may be staggered.
Other Variables
Control Variables: Following the literature on the determinants of FDI, we include the following variables in our regressions. We use trade=GDP as a measure of openness and the rate of in ‡ation as a measure of macroeconomic uncertainty. We employ two measures to capture the level of infrastructure development in host countries: (i) the number of telephones per 100 population; and (ii) gross …xed capital formation as a share of GDP. 10 All else equal, openness to trade, lower in ‡ation and a better physical infrastructure should have a positive e¤ect on FDI. Higher domestic incomes imply a greater demand for goods and services and therefore make the host country more attractive for FDI. Asiedu and Lien (2003) …nd that domestic income has to achieve a certain threshold in order to facilitate FDI ‡ows. Thus, following Asiedu and Lien (2003), we include both GDP per capita and the square of GDP per capita in our regressions.
Robustness Variables:
The robustness regressions employ data on measures of institutional quality, political instability and FDI risk in host countries. As pointed out in the introduction, democracies are generally associated with better institutions, such as private property protection and better enforcement of laws and regulations. Thus, it is possible that our measures of democracy are not capturing the "true" level of democratization in FDI host countries, but rather the measures are a proxy for the quality of institutions in these countries. If that is the case, then our results are driven by institutional quality and not by democracy. We attempt to capture the "pure"e¤ect of democracy on FDI by controlling for institutional quality in host countries. We consider three measures of institutional quality which re ‡ect (i) corruption (ii) the impartiality of the legal system; and (iii) bureaucratic quality in host countries. We also note that democracy does not necessarily imply political stability. For example, riots and assassinations can occur even in a democratic country (Bollen and Jackman, 1989) . We consider two measures of political instability which re ‡ect:
(i) the level of internal and external con ‡ict; and (ii) the stability of the government in power.
Finally, we include a variable that captures the risk to investment as a result of "hostile" government actions (e.g., expropriation) and restrictions on FDI. We did not include these variables in our benchmark regressions because the data are from the ICRG and are available for a limited number of countries. Speci…cally, the number of countries drop from 112 to 87, and the number of observations decrease from 652 to 551.
Estimation Procedure
We estimate a linear dynamic panel-data (DPD) model to capture the e¤ect of lagged FDI on current FDI. DPD models contain unobserved panel-level e¤ects that are correlated with the lagged dependent variable, and this renders standard estimators inconsistent. The GMM estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) provides consistent estimates for such models. This estimator often referred to as the "di¤erence"GMM estimator di¤erences the data …rst and then uses lagged values of the endogenous variables as instruments. However, as pointed out by Arellano and Bover (1995), lagged levels are often poor instruments for …rst di¤erences. Blundell and Bond (1998) proposed a more e¢ cient estimator, the "system" GMM estimator, which mitigates the poor instruments problem by using additional moment conditions. However, the system estimator has one disadvantage: it utilizes too many instruments. Thus, the di¤erence estimator su¤ers from the "weak"instruments problem and the system estimator exhibits the "too many" instruments problem (Hayakawa, 2007) . Indeed, as shown by Acemoglu et al. (2005) and Bobba and Coviello (2007) , the two estimation procedures can produce strikingly di¤erent results. 11 Thus, in order to increase the credibility of our results, we report the estimations for both the di¤erence and system estimators. Now, the two estimation procedures assume that there is no autocorrelation in the idiosyncratic errors. Hence, for each regression, we test for autocorrelation and the validity of the instruments. Speci…cally, we report the p-values for the test for second order autocorrelation as well as the Hansen J test for overidentifying restrictions. These tests, however, lose power when the number of instruments, i, is large relative to the cross section sample size (in our case, the number of countries), n-in particular when the instrument ratio, r, de…ned as r = n=i < 1 (Roodman, 2007; Stata, 2009). Thus, when r < 1, the assumptions underlying the two procedures may be violated. Furthermore, a lower r raises the suscepti-bility of the estimates to a Type 1 error-i.e., producing signi…cant results even though there is no underlying association between the variables involved (Roodman, 2007). The easiest solution to this problem is to reduce the instrument count by limiting the number of lagged levels to be included as instruments (Roodman, 2007; Stata, 2009 ). In all the 18 benchmark regressions and in 27 out of the 38 robustness regressions, r 1, and therefore we do not restrict the number of lags of the dependent variable used for instrumentation. For the 11 cases where r < 1, we limit the number of lagged levels to be included as instruments to the point where r 1, and we check whether our results are robust to the reduction in instrument count.
We end the section by providing some details about our estimation strategy. 12 First, we use the two-step GMM estimator, which is asymptotically e¢ cient and robust to all kinds of heteroskedasticity. Second, the independent variables are treated as strictly exogenous in all the regressions, with the exception of four robustness regressions where democracy and natural resources are considered to be endogenous. Third, our regressions utilize only internal instruments-we do not include additional (external) instruments. Speci…cally, both the di¤erence and system estimators use the …rst di¤erence of all the exogenous variables as standard instruments, and the lags of the endogenous variables to generate the GMM-type instruments described in Arellano and Bond (1991). Furthermore, the system estimations include lagged di¤erences of the endogenous variables as instruments for the level equation, but the di¤erence estimations do not.
Benchmark Regressions
We estimate the equation:
where i refers to countries, t to time, i is the country-speci…c e¤ect, f di is net F DI=GDP , dem is a measure of democracy, nat is a measure of natural resource export intensity, nat dem is the interaction term, and Z is a vector of control variables.
(i) Does democracy have a direct e¤ect on FDI?
To answer this question we estimate equation (1) without the interaction term, nat dem.
The parameter of interest is the coe¢ cient of dem, . The results are reported in Table 2 .
Note that b is positive and signi…cant at the 1% level in all the regressions, suggesting that 12 We used Stata 10 for our regressions. We now turn our attention to the other variables. Natural resource export intensity has an adverse e¤ect on FDI; openness to trade, good infrastructure and less in ‡ation promote FDI; and GDP per capita has a positive impact on FDI only if income per capita exceeds a certain threshold. The estimated coe¢ cient of lagged f di, b , is negative, suggesting that current f di is negatively correlated with future f di. Note that a one unit increase in the level of current democracy on current f di is equal to b , and the long run e¤ect on f di is
, this result implies that past levels of democratization has an impact on current and future f di ‡ows, however, the e¤ect subsides over time.
(ii) Do natural resources undermine the positive e¤ect of democracy on FDI?
We estimate equation (1) . Now, @f di=@dem = + nat, and therefore the parameters of interest are and . To conserve on space we report only the values of b and b in Table   3 . The full estimation results are available in the supplementary …le. In all the regressions, b > 0 and signi…cant at the 1% level, and b < 0 and signi…cant at the 1% level. This suggests natural resources signi…cantly alter the relationship between FDI by reducing the Table 4 . Note that @f di=@dem drops substantially as nat increases from the 10 th to the 75 th percentile of nat. For the di¤erence GMM estimations, the decline in @f di=@dem is about 83% for the regression using f ree, 82% for polity, and 81% for icrg; and for the system estimations, @f di=@dem decreases by about 83%, 82% and 81% for f ree, polity and icrg, respectively. This indicates that natural resources drastically reduces the e¤ectiveness of democracy in promoting FDI.
(iii) Can natural resources completely neutralize the positive e¤ect of democracy on FDI?
As shown in Table 4 , the estimated value of @f di=@dem is positive and signi…cant, up to the 75 th percentile of nat, suggesting that democracy has a positive e¤ect on FDI for at least three quarters of the countries in the sample. However, the estimated value of @f di=@dem loses signi…cance or turns negative and signi…cant when evaluated at the 90 th percentile of nat, an indication that for at least 10% of the countries in our sample, democracy has no signi…cant e¤ect on FDI or has a negative e¤ect.
(iv) Which countries may bene…t from an improvement in democratization and which countries may not?
To answer this question, we categorize our sample countries into two: Category A refer to countries where an expansion in democratic rights may promote FDI, and Category B comprise of countries where an increase in democracy may not result in an increase in FDI, and may possibly reduce FDI. We now attempt to identify the countries in the two categories.
We …rst note that b > 0 and b < 0, implying that there exists a critical value of nat, nat , such that @f di=@dem = b + b nat = 0. This implies that @f di=@dem > 0 if and only if nat < nat , suggesting that countries for which nat < nat fall in Category A and countries for which nat nat fall in Category B. In classifying the countries, we compare each country's nat (i.e., the value of nat averaged over the period 1982-2007) with nat . Note that each of the six regressions will produce a di¤erent value of nat . 13 Our selection criteria is based on the median value of nat , which is approximately equal to 52%. Thus, countries for which nat < 52% fall in Category A and the remaining countries fall in Category B. There are 90 countries in Category A (about 80% of the countries in the sample) and 22 countries in Category B. Note that @f di=@dem 0 for the Category B countries, suggesting that all else equal, foreign direct investors may prefer less democratic governments in these 22 countries.
The countries are Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bolivia, Chile, Congo Republic, Gabon, Iran, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Russia, Seychelles, Syria, Trinidad, Venezuela, Yemen and Zambia.
14 (v) Does the e¤ect of democracy on FDI depend on the type of natural resource?
Recall that nat = f e + me, where f e is the share of fuel in total merchandise exports and me is the share of metals and ore in total merchandise exports. Boschini et al. (2007) …nd that di¤erent types of natural resources have di¤erent e¤ects on economic growth.
Thus, a question that comes to bear is whether the type of natural resources is relevant in determining the e¤ect of democracy on FDI. For example, Zambia and Nigeria are resource intensive countries. However, Zambia's exports are concentrated in hard minerals (2% oil and 87% minerals) whereas Nigeria's exports are mainly in oil (96% oil and 0:03% minerals).
Is the partial e¤ect of democracy on FDI for these two countries statistically di¤erent? We re-estimate equation (1) where we use f e and me as measures of natural resources, i.e.,
Here, @f di=@dem = + 1 f e + 2 me. The values of b , c 1 and c 2 are reported in Table 5 . Note that b is positive and signi…cant at the 1% level, and c 1 and c 2 are negative and signi…cant at the 1% level in all the regressions. This suggests that both oil and minerals undermine the positive e¤ect of democracy on FDI. We now determine whether the interaction e¤ect of democracy and natural resources on FDI is signi…cantly di¤erent for fuel and minerals. Here, we test the hypothesis H 0 : 1 = 2 . As shown in Table 5, we refuse to reject H 0 in …ve out of the six regressions. Our results therefore suggest that overall, the type and the composition of resource intensity are not relevant in determining the interaction e¤ect of democracy and natural resources on FDI.
Robustness Regressions
In order to have a reasonable sample size, the robustness estimations employ the measure of democracy that has the highest number of observations, i.e., f ree. Furthermore, to keep the discussion focused and also conserve on space, we report a summary of the results in Tables   6, 7 and 8. The full estimation results are available in the supplementary …le. Below, we provide a brief discussion of the robustness estimations.
(i) Sub-samples: According to Blonigen and Wang (2005) , the determinants of FDI to poor countries are di¤erent from the determinants of FDI to more developed economies. Asiedu (2002) also …nds that the factors that drive FDI to Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) are di¤erent from the factors that drive FDI to other developing countries. We therefore run separate regressions for middle income, low income, SSA and non-SSA countries. We also note that our results may be driven by the extensive political transformation that took place in Eastern Europe in the 1990s. We examine this hypothesis by running regressions where we exclude Transition countries.
The number of countries for the middle income, low income and SSA samples are small, and as a consequence, the intrument ratio, r < 1. For these samples, we check whether the result are robust to a reduction in instrument count, i.e., when we limit the instrument count such that r > 1. In Panel A of Table 6, (iii) Alternative Measures of Democracy: The de…nitions of f ree, polity and icrg are di¤erent, suggesting that the information in these indicators is not identical. However, the democracy variables are highly correlated and the coe¢ cients are signi…cant at the 1% level, suggesting that there is a high degree of commonality between the variables. 15 We run a factor analysis on f ree, policy and icrg and use the principal component as a measure of democracy. We also compute the average of f ree, polity and icrg and use that as proxy for The benchmark regressions do not include time …xed e¤ects. One reason for including time …xed e¤ects is to expunge the e¤ect of business cycles. However, including time dummies increases the number of instruments employed in the regressions, and this in turn weakens the reliability of the empirical results. As it is standard in the literature, we averaged the FDI data over four years to smooth out cyclical ‡uctuations. We however, test whether our results hold when we include time …xed e¤ects.
Note that one could use FDI per capita as a dependent variable to analyze the e¤ect of democracy on FDI ‡ows. We used an alternative measure, F DI=GDP for the following reasons. First, the studies on the determinants of FDI typically employ F DI=GDP as dependent variable. Second, the data on F DI=GDP has a wider coverage. For example 15 The correlation coe¢ cient, , is = 0:89 for f ree and polity, 0:68 for icrg and f ree, and 0:64 for polity and icrg.
the number of observations drop by about 20% (from 650 to 520) when we employ FDI per capita as dependent variable. We note that the e¤ect of democracy on F DI=GDP might re ‡ect the impact of democracy on F DI, on GDP or both F DI and GDP . Thus, we examine whether our results hold when we use FDI per capita as the dependent variable.
Panel D shows that b and b are signi…cant at the 1% level in all the four regressions.
(v) FDI Risk, Quality of Institutions and Political Risk: The results are reported in Table 7 . We considered two speci…cations. Speci…cally, we run regressions where we included the measures of FDI risk, institutional quality and Political Risk one at a time (vi) Endogeneity of Democracy and Natural Resources: As pointed out in the introduction, democracy could be endogenous. Also, there is a potential endogeneity problem associated with our measure of natural resources. Speci…cally, it is possible that an unobserved variable may a¤ect both FDI and exports. Since we measure natural resources as a share of exports, it is possible that our estimates are biased. The di¤erence and the system estimators mitigate the endogeneity problem. However, in order to be thorough, we address this issue explicitly by specifying democracy and natural resources as endogenous variables in our regressions.
Note that if democracy is endogenous, then the interaction between democracy and natural resources is also endogenous. We consider two cases. In case 1, only democracy is treated as endogenous. Thus here, we re-estimate equation (1) where we specify dem and nat dem as endogenous variables. In case 2, both democracy and natural resources are treated as endogenous and therefore the endogenous variables are dem, nat, and nat dem.
The results are reported in Table 8 . As expected, the introduction of the endogenous variables increases the instrument count substantially, and as a consequence r is low. 16 
Conclusion
This paper has examined the interaction between democracy, natural resources and FDI. We The data on FDI/GDP and democracy are averaged from 1982-2007. The democracy variable ranges from zero to 1, a higher number implies more democratic rights. Non-resource exporting countries (i.e. Group 1) comprise of countries where the sum of minerals and oil in total merchandise exports, ̅̅̅̅̅ , is less than 50% and resource exporting countries (i.e., Group 2) consists of countries where ̅̅̅̅̅ . There are 65 countries in Group 1 and 22 countries in Group 2. Democracy seems to be positively correlated with FDI/GDP for non-resource exporting countries (figure 1a), but uncorrelated for natural resource exporting countries (figure 1b). An OLS regression of democracy on FDI for Group 1 countries yielded, ̂ , with robust p-value=0.021 and ; and for Group 2 countries, ̂ , robust p-value= 0.842 and . See Table A1 in the appendix for the list of countries. The data on FDI/GDP and democracy are averaged from 1982-2007. The democracy variable ranges from zero to 1, a higher number implies more democratic rights. Non-resource exporting countries (i.e. Group 1) comprise of countries where the sum of minerals and oil in total merchandise exports, ̅̅̅̅̅ , is less than 50% and resource exporting countries (i.e., Group 2) consists of countries where ̅̅̅̅̅ . There are 65 countries in Group 1 and 22 countries in Group 2. Democracy seems to be positively correlated with FDI/GDP for non-resource exporting countries (figure 2a), but uncorrelated for natural resource exporting countries ( figure 2b ). An OLS regression of democracy on FDI for Group 1 countries yielded, ̂ , with robust p-value=0.038 and ; and for Group 2 countries, ̂ , robust p-value= 0.972 and . See Table A1 in the appendix for the list of countries. The data on FDI/GDP and democracy are averaged from 1982-2007. The democracy variable ranges from zero to 1, a higher number implies more democratic rights. Non-resource exporting countries (i.e. Group 1) comprise of countries where the sum of minerals and oil in total merchandise exports, ̅̅̅̅̅ , is less than 50% and resource exporting countries (i.e., Group 2) consists of countries where ̅̅̅̅̅ . There are 65 countries in Group 1 and 22 countries in Group 2. Democracy seems to be positively correlated with FDI/GDP for non-resource exporting countries (figure 3a), and negatively uncorrelated for natural resource exporting countries ( figure 3b ). An OLS regression of democracy on FDI for Group 1 yielded ̂ , with robust p-value=0.001 and ; and for Group 2, ̂ , robust p-value= 0.373 and . The democracy variables f ree, polity and icrg are from Freedom House, Polity IV and International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), respectively. The data are normalized to lie between zero and one, such that a higher number implies more democracy. F DI is the net in ‡ows in current US$, Trade is the sum of imports and exports, in ‡ation is based on the annual CPI, investment=GDP is the share of gross …xed capital formation in GDP, phones is the number telephone lines per 100 people, GDP per capita is in constant 2000 US$, f uel=exports is the share of fuel in total merchandize exports and minerals=exports is the share of minerals and ore in total merchandize exports. The data are from the World Development Indicators (2009), published by the World Bank. The data on institutions, FDI risk and political instability are from the ICRG. Corruption re ‡ects the level of corruption within the political system, law and order measures the e¤ectiveness of the rule of law, bureaucracy refers to the institutional strength and quality of the bureaucracy, FDI risk re ‡ects the risk of expropriation and government constraints on pro…t repatriation, con ‡ict is the average of internal con ‡ict (such as political violence within the country) and external con ‡ict (such as cross-border con ‡icts), and instability of government re ‡ects the ability of government to stay in o¢ ce. Similar to the democracy measures, the data are normalized to lie between zero and one, such that a higher number implies more corruption, better law enforcement, higher FDI risk and higher political instability. Freedom House, Polity IV and The International Country Risk Guide, respectively. The data are normalized to lie between zero and one. A higher number implies more democracy. 1 The null hypothesis is that the instruments are not correlated with the residuals. 2 The null hypothesis is that the errors in the …rst di¤erence regression exhibit no second order serial correlation. The null hypothesis is that the instruments are not correlated with the residuals. 2 The null hypothesis is that the errors in the …rst di¤erence regression exhibit no second order serial correlation. FDI risk re ‡ects the risk of exprorpriation and government contraints on pro…t repatriation; corruption re ‡ects the level of corruption within the political system; law and order measures the e¤ectiveness of the rule of law; bureaucracy refers to the institutional strength and quality of the bureaucracy; con ‡ict is the average of internal con ‡ict and external con ‡ict; and instability of government re ‡ects the ability of government to stay in o¢ ce.
The data are normalized to lie between zero and one, such that a higher number implies more corruption, better law enforcement, higher FDI risk and more political instability. The democracy data are normalized so they range from zero to one. A higher number implies more democracy.
Natural resources is the share of fuel and minerals in total merchandize exports (%). All the data are averaged from 1982-2007. a refers to countries in Sub-Saharan Africa that are not low-income. 
